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No. 84-1973 
Three Affiliated Tribes 
v. 
Wold Engineering, et 
al. 
~ 
Cert to Supreme Court of N. 
Dakota (Erickstad, C.J., 
VandeWalle, Girke, Pederson 
[ Sur r og ate J) ) 
State/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr presents two issues: ( 1) Whether a 
,. 
state statute depriving '~ribal plaintiffs of access to state - ---7 - '-""' 
courts in circumstances where non-Indian plaintiffs may maintain -
actions violates tribal plaintiffs' equal protection rights; and 
(2) Whether federal law prohibits a state from requiring an Indi-
.. 
- 2 -
an tribe to waive its immunity from state civil jurisdiction for ----------- --~ 
all cases as a condition for bringing a damages action against a 
non-Indian defendant in state court. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: 
This Court reviewed the N.D. S.Ct. 's initial decision up-
holding the challenged state statute and affirming the state 
court's dismissal of petr 's action for want of subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold 
Reservation v. Wold Engineering (Three Tribes I), 52 U.S.L.W. 
4647 (May 29, 1984). Because it was unclear whether the N.D. 
S.Ct. 's decision rested on a misinterpretation of federal law, 
vJ~ this Court acated the judgment and remand for reconsideration 
~Mot the state law ques 10n. On remand, the N.D. s.ct. held that 
the challenged state statute barred petr, a federally recognized 
Indian tribe, from maintaining its damages suit against resp, a 
non-Indian engineering firm, in state court as a matter of state 
law and that this jurisdictional bar did not violate the state or 
federal constitutions. Petr therefore petitions the Court to re-
view the constitutional challenge it did not reach in Three 
Tribes I. The following is an attempt to summarize the progress 
of petr 's litigation from its incept ion to the present; for a 
fuller presentation, see Three Tribes I. 
The federal government eliminated its pre-existing bar of 
state jurisdiction over Indian territories in 1953 with the en-
actment of Pub. L. 280. As applied to N. Dakota, Pub. L. 280 --permitted the state to amend the federally-imposed disclaimer of 





stitution and to assume jurisdiction over civil and criminal ac-
tions involving Indians and arising in Indian country. 
In 1957 (before the state moved to assume jurisdiction under 
Pub. L. 280), the N.D. S.Ct. held that the existing jurisdiction-
al bar foreclosed civil jurisdiction over Indian lands only in 
cases involving interests in Indian lands themselves. Vermillion 
v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432 (1957). 
In 19 58, N. Dakota amended its constitution to allow for 
assumption of jurisdiction over Indian country and in 1963 the N. 
Dakota legis';::;;;"r~ en;c_te~ which ~ro~es: -
In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 
280 and [the amended] North Dakota constitution, 
jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be ex-
tended over all civil causes of action which arise on 
an Indian reservation ~~n=acceptan&3 by Indian citi-
rov i'<fe by this chap~ac-
ce ance the jurisdict1o o shall be to the 
same extent that the state has jurisdiction over other 
civil causes of action, and those civil laws of this 
state that are of general application to private prop-
erty shall have the same force and ef feet with in such 
Indian reservation or Indian coun ry as t ey have e se-
where within --
The consent provision contained in ch. 27-19 was included in 
response to Indian concerns about having state civil jurisdiction 
imposed upon them against their will. 
In subsequent cases, The N.D. S.Ct. read ch. 27-19 to con-
stitute a disclaimer of state jurisdiction (recognized in Vermil-
lion) in the absence of Indian acceptance of jurisdiction. Those 
cases, however, all involved Indian defendants; the S.Ct. never 
explicitly passed on the question of whether "residuary jurisdic-
tion" remained in cases involving Indian plaintiffs and non-
Indian defendants. 
• 
\ . ' 
·( 
- 4 -
In 1968, Pub. L. 280 was amended to require that all subse-
quent state assurnpt ions of juri sd ict ion be preceded by tribal 
consent. 
The instant controversy began when Petr encountered diffi-
culty with the water system project it had contracted with resp 
to design for the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. As petr's 
t' ~\ 
tribal court did not have jurisdiction over the suit, petr sued 
resp in N. Dakota state court, alleging negligence and breach of 
contract. Resp counterclaimed, asserting that petr had failed to 
$r cl-' 
pay it. The court dismissed the action on the ground that it did ~ 
~ •.. ,.~ 
not have the subject rna t ter juri sd ict ion to hear claims arising >J ..,.._ , 
in Indian country absent tribal consent, which had not been give~ 
by the Three Affiliated Tribes. The N.D. S.Ct. affirmed the dis-
missal, holding that "pursuant to Public Law 280," the N. Dakota 
legislature had totally disclaimed any jurisdiction over civil 
causes of action arising on an Indian reservation absent tribal 
consent. The S.Ct. also held that prohibiting an Indian plain-
tiff from suing a non-Indian in state court in circumstances 
where a non-Indian could maintain such a suit does not deny Indi-
ans equal protection in violation of the federal constitution or 
equal access to the courts in violation of the N. Dakota consti-
tution. 
"Because of the cornplexi ty and importance of the issue" 
posed by the N.D. S.Ct. 's decision, Three Tribes I, 52 U.S.L.W., 
at 4650, this Court granted certiorari. The Co~eld that no 
federal law or policy precludes N. Dakota from asserting the ju-




(i. e., Indians suing non-Indians). In particular, the Court 
) 
ruled that Pub. L. 280 neither required N. Dakota to disclaim the 
......----... 
basic jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion or authorized it to 
do so. Id., at 4651. The Court then had to determine whether the 
N.D. S.Ct. had held that ch. 27-19 foreclosed petr's suit purely 
as a matter of state law, in which case the Court would be faced 
with petr 's federal constitutional challenges to that statute. 
After examining the N.D. S. Ct. 's reasoning, the Court concluded 
that the S.Ct. apparently based its decision on the erroneous 
~
assumption that Pub. L. 280 either authorized the jurisdictional ---
disclaimer or forbade the exercise of jurisdiction absent tribal 
) co:_:_~t:_:-TThe Court therefore vacated the state court judgment 
~nd remanded for reconsideration of the state law question. 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented. _,. 
The dissent disagreed with the Court's reading of Pub. L. 280, 
asserted that the N.D. S.Ct. 's resolution of the issue was based 
on state law, and noted that the only remaining federal question 
presented, petr's equal protection claim, was insubstantial given 
Tribes of the Yakima Indian 439 u.s. 463 
( 1979) (discussed below) • 
On remand, the N.D. S. Ct. held that because "neither [ch. ~~ 
.n---
27-19] itself nor [its] legislative history provides for or rec~ 
ognizes any type of 'residuary' state jurisdiction, we conclude 
that [ch. 27-19] terminated any such jurisdiction if it did pre-
viously exist." App. A-8. It emphasized that its decision rest-




S.Ct. then held that the statute, so construed, did not violate 
any provision of the N. Dakota constitution. 
Finally, the S.Ct. held that the jurisdictional bar did not 
violate petr's federal equal protection and due process rights. 
--------------- -----It rejected petr's assertion that "Chapter 27-19 represents con-
stitutionally suspect class-based legislation that singles out a 
discrete, insular minority for d i sad van taged leg isla t i ve treat-
ment," citing Yakima, supra, as controlling. 
In Yakima, the Washington legislature passed a statute that 
required the state to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians and Indian territory within the state, on the condition 
that in all but eight subject matter areas, j ur isd iction would 
not extend to Indians on trust or restricted lands absent request 
of the tribe. The statute provided that in the remaining eight 
areas, the state would unconditionally assume jurisdiction. The 
Court held, inter alia, that this "checkerboard" pattern of ju-
risdiction applicable on the reservations of non-consenting 
tribes was not on its face invalid under the equal protect ion 
clause. 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court rejected the 
tribe's contentions that (1) the classifications implicit in the 
statute were "suspect" and therefore could not stand unless jus-
tified by a compelling state interest, and (2) the tribe's inter-
est in self-government is a fundamental right and because the 
statute abridged that right, it was presumptively invalid. Id., 
at 500. The Court reasoned that due to the unique status of In-






legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive 
because it singles out tribal Indians. Id., 501. The Court then 
found that although the states do not have the same prerogative, 
Pub. L. 280 authorized the Washington statute at issue and con-
ta ined many of the same classifications; thus the argument that 
the classifications were suspect was untenable. The Court then 
noted that "[t]he contention that [the challenged statute] 
abridges a 1 fundamental right 1 is also untenable. It is also 
well established that Congress, in the exercise of its plenary 
power over Indian affairs, may restrict the retained sovereign 
powers of the Indian tribes In enacting [the challenged 
statute], Washington was legislating under explicit authority 
granted by Congress in the exercise of that federal power." Id. 
The Court then applied the rational relationship standard of re-
view and found the statute constitutional on its face. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr first contends that the N. Dakota 
statute violates its equal protection rights in that it subjects 
a discrete and insular class (tribal Indians residing on federal 
reservations) to disadvantaged treatment regarding a fundamental 
right (access to the courts). Petr does not distinguish Yakima. 
Rather, it relies on United Jewish Organization v. 430 
u.s. 144, 165 (1977), and Regents of University of California v. 
(§;> 438 U o So 265, 298 (1978) , for the proposition that ethni-
cally or racially based state legislation that is intended to 
minimize the consequences of racial discrimination is subject to 
heightened scrutiny. It then uses various concerns mentioned in 
Justice Brennan 1 s Carey concurrance to test the validity of the 
- 0 -
statute. 430 u.s., at 172-176. In particular, petr argues that 
ch. 27-19 is invalid because it in fact stigmatizes and disadvan-
~ :7 
tages tribal Indians. 
~Petr's s~, which may not have been raised below 
as the N.D. S.Ct. did not mention it, is that federal law pre-
eludes a state from requiring that Indians waive their sovereign 
immunity in all cases as a condition for suing in state court. 
Petr claims that because a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity 
would disrupt its federally recognized rights of tribal autonomy 
and self-government, authority for requiring such a waiver must 
come from Congress. 
Resp responds to petr 's equal protection claim by arguing 
that the classifications contained in ch. 27-19 are politically, 
not racially, based. It asserts that N. Dakota initially pro-
posed to unilaterally take full jurisdiction over Indian country 
pursuant to Pub. L. 280 (prior to the 19 68 amendment) but, in 
response to Indian residents' objections, arrived at a political 
compromise whereby the state would not assume any jurisdiction 
over claims by or against Indians until the tribe consented. It 
notes that disparate treatment based on political differences is 
not automatically constitutionally suspect. Morton v. Mancar i, 
417 u.s. 537 (1974). Moreover, it argues that if this court were 
to strike the juri sd ict ional bar to Indians bringing suit, it 
would be unfair to non-Indians who may not sue Indians in state 
court. In this case, for example, petr might be able to recover 
against resp, but resp would be unable to maintain its counter-
claim against petr in state court. Finally, resp relies on Yaki-
- 9 -
rna, and states that the statute is rationally related to legiti-
mate state policies. Resp' s response to petr 's second argument 
~--~·, ~-~~4W~ 
/~---'' Vk-~~~~~ 
Yakima stands for the proposition that~~~ 
is difficult to make out. 
4. DISCUSSION: 
a state acting pursuant to congressional authority can single out 
--·-- -
Indians for treatment that might otherwise be constitutionally 
offensive. It does not seem to control in this case because the 
Court held in Three Tribes I that Pub. L. 280 does not authorize 
or require states to disclaim pre-existing jurisdiction over 
claims asserted by Indians against non-Indians. Once Yakima is 
distinguished, petr's equal protection claim presents a substan-
tial question, under traditional equal protection analysis if not 
-------------------------------~ under the analysis petr presents. It is unclear whether petr's 
second argument is properly before the Court as it does not seem 
to have been argued be low. (Note: Petr did not present argu-
ments based on 42 u.s.c. §1981 ("All persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States shall have the same right in every 
State and Territory ••. to sue •.• as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens.") in state court or in the instant petition). 
The SG requested that the Court take cert in Three Tribes I. 
Because petr's equal protection claim appears viable and the same 
considerations that justified review in the last round would seem 
to hold true, I recommend GRANT. 
There is a response. 
August 9, 1985 O'Sullivan opn in petn 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell March 5, 1986 
From: Cabell 
No. 84-1973, Affilliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, et al. 
Cert to NO s.ct. Mon., Mar. 24 (1st case) 
Question Presented 
Does North Dakota's Chapter 27-19, which bars tribal 
plaintiffs from State courts unless the tribe waives sovereign 
immunity before those courts, violate Equal Protection, Due Proc-
ess, or "Indian policy and decisional law"? 
!. BACKGROUND 
In 1963, the North Dakota legislature enacted Chapter 
27-19, the Indian Civil Jurisdictional Act. Onder Chapter 27-19, 
a tribal government must waive immunity from State court civil ------
jurisdiction in all cases to bring an on-reservation damages ac-
tion against a non-Indian defendant. Petr, the Three Affiliated 
Tribes have never made such a waiver. 
In 197 4, petr contracted with resps for a public works 
water project on petr's reservation. The "Four Bears water Sys-
tern Project," however, was a failure, and in 1980 petr sought 
redress against resp in state court, alleging breach of contract 
and negligence. Resp successfully moved to have the court dis-
miss the action on the ground that the state court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction since the case arose on an Indian reserva-
tion. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the result, 
holding that the N.D. State Legislature had authority to pass 
Chapter 27-19 under an Act of Congress, Public Law 280, and that 
unt~i_l_~b=._ co~_t_e_d_ .... to __ j _u_r_~_s_d_i_c _ !,_i_52_n ___ i_~ @ state court 
cases, 
~ 
the present action was barred. 
This Court, per JO.S'l'ICE BLACKMON, vacated and remanded 
because of a possible misreading of federal law. This Court held -
that federal law did not compel the State Act, and the Court re-
manded for the State Supreme Court to determine whether the .State 
~~--~------~-~-~-~--~-~-----~------------------------------------·~~ 
had foreclosed~ as a matter of State rather than fed-
 
eral law. JUSTICE REHNQOIST, joined by JO.STICE .STEVENS, dissent-
,.. ._.., 
ed, arguing that the federal question presented was insubstantial 
. .. 
' 
under Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, .439 u.s. 463, 500-501 
(1971), where the Court rejected a challenge to a Washington 
statute that conditioned state jurisdiction over Indian lands in 
some subject matter areas on Indian consent. (In Yakima, howev- f 
er, the State was acting pursuant to explicit congressional au- f 
thor i ty.) 
On remand, in a testy opinion, the State Supreme Court 
held that Chapter 27-19 terminated any pre-existing right to sue 
Jtz,/A~ 
non-Indians in State courts that tribal plaintiffs could claim ~
under Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2<( 342 (1957), and that 
those plaintiffs could litigate in State courts only after their 
tribe had completely submitted to State court jurisdiction. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Chapter 27-19 is a statute based on a racial classifica-
tion and -- therefore subject to strict scrutiny. The statute's -denial of access to courts is a second, independent reason to 
subject the statute to strict scrutiny. Chapter 27-19 also vio-
--·~~-~-·-- - --
lates Federal Indian - law embodied both in this Court's decisions 
and in Pub.L. 90-284. 
A. Pub.L. 90-284 
Petr s and amicus Standing Rock Sioux Tribe argue that 
Pub.L. 90-284 (Title IV of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968) 
evidenced Congress' intent to completely occupy the field and 
·exclude any future acquisition by States over Indian affairs -
including by tribal transfer - except as allowed by federal stat-
ute. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 u.s. 423 (1971). Under 
Pub.L. 90-284, a tribe cannot consent to a transfer of jurisdic-
tion to a State without a majority vote of the adult tribal Indi-
ans at a federally supervised election. 25 o.s.c. §1326. This 
Court has held that Congress completely occupied the field in 
, I 
Pub.L. 90-284 regarding future state acquisition of any jurisdic-
tion over Indian affairs. Kenn~rlY v. District Court, supra, at 
429 (holding Pub.L. 90-284 prohibited Montana's assumption of 
civil jurisdiction over tribal Indians on reservation even with 
•', 
consent of tribal government). 
Resp argues that Pub.L. 90-284 is. inapposite because it 
applies only to post-1968 acquisitions of jurisdiction. In 1963, 
resp argues, Chapter 27-19 took "all steps required to obligate 
[North DakotaJ to an assumption of jurisdiction," and that Chap-
ter 27-19 "is therefore not affected by later Congressional acts 
which now govern the actions of other states in assuming juris-
diction over Indian country." Resp Brief 9-10. This character-
ization, however, is at odds with later sections of resp's brief. 
!d., at 22 · (Chapter 27-19 "completely disclaimed all jurisdiction 
in Indian country"). It is also at odds with N.D. Supreme Court 
precedent. In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694 (1963) (holding 
State did not assume jurisdiction in 1963). As this Court char-
acterized the State law: "Chapter 27-19 actually disclaimed all 
jurisdiction over claims arising in Indian country absent Indian 
consent." Wold 1, 104 s.ct., at 2272. 
1 believe Chapter 27-19 conflicts with Pub.L. 90-284 
because it does not condition a transfer of Indian jurisdiction 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I 
upon a federally supervised election~ ~he~efore, it is possible 
~ 
to overturn the law solely because of its conflict with the pre-
empting federal law, Pub.L. 90-284. '!'he disadvantage of this 
simple and clean disposition is that it leaves the State free to 
enact a successor to Chapter 27-19 that provides for federal su-
pervision of elections while continuing to predicate Indians' 
access to court upon a complete waiver of their sovereign immuni-
ty. Because I believe that this hypothetical replacement to 
Chapter 27-19 is likely, and because I believe that the State may 
not constitutionally impose such a condition upon Indians' access ------------
to its courts, I recommend you consider reaching the Equa~_ Pro---------
tection and Due Process arguments raised by petr and amicus 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. 
B. Violation of Equal Protection 
Petr and amicus make a straightforward Equal Protection 
argument. Chapter 27-19 makes a classification based solely on 
race (Indians are a discreet and insular minority), and therefore 
that statute is subject to strict scrutiny. Loving v. Virginia, 
388 u.s. 1, 9 (1967). 
Resp and the State s.ct. first argue that Chapter 27-19 
is justified by the special federal power over Indian affairs. 
Brief 29-31; 364 N.W.2d, at 106-107. Resp and its allies argue 
that because Congress may make rules and impose regulations con-
cerning Indians that would otherwise be unconstitutional, and 
because Chapter 27-19 was enacted as a specific response to 
Pub.L. 280 (allowing State assumption of jurisdiction over Indi-
~ 
&/fl 
' ~~~ ,,_-c....c.,. 
ans), Chapter 27-19 is cloaked by the same protection that feder-
al laws enjoy. 
It is, of course, true that Pub.L. 280 would protect 
certain State legislation from strict scrutiny even though the 
State Act may be based on a racial classification. Pub.L. 
does not, 
280 1 
however, shield any legislation that concerns Indians 
and State jurisdiction. Certainly it is clear that the State Act 
must have a clear and substantial relation to the congressional 
-- ~--
law that State cites for constitutional safe passage. If it were 
------------~----~ ------------------------- " --"-" ~ -----.--otherwise, there would be no elephant too big to fit under that 
tent. There is nothing in the text of Pub.L. 280 that would jus-
tify ~ which is essentially what Chapter 
27-19 is. See Wold I, 104 s.ct., at 2276, 2277-2278. 
Resps also defend Chapter 27-19 as a political classifi-
cation under Morton v. Mancari, 471 u.s. 535 (1974). In that 
case, the Court held that the "unique legal status of Indian 
tribes under federal law," id., at 551, permits the federal gov-
ernment to single out tribal Indians in legislation that might 
otherwise be unconstitutional. The holding was bottomed on the 
constitutional grant of power of Indian tribes, Art. I, §8, cl. 
3, and the longstanding federal role as guardian and protector of 
Indian tribes. ~., at 551-553. The States do not enjoy a simi-
lar special relationship with Indian tribes. Washington v. Yaki-
rna Inidan Nation, 439 u.s. 463, 501 (1979). 
Resps make a final argument that Chapter 27-19 "more 
fairly advances the goals of equal protection" by placing both 
Indians and non-Indians "on equal footing before the State's 
courts." Brief 13. This silly argument , scarely deserves men-
tion, and has long since been put to rest. Williams v. Lee, 358 
u.s. 217 (1959); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co., 309 u.s. 506, 512-513 (1940); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. 
Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1344-1345 (CAlO 1982). 
'!'he State, as amicus, also argues that Chapter 27-19 
does not violate Equal Protection (or Due Process) because the 
law "does not act as a bar, but rather acts as an opportunity for 
Indians and Indian tribes to take advantage of the jurisdictional 
offer given them by the State of North Dakota." Brief 2. This 
argument over looks Chapter 27-19's crucial sin: it closes the 
---------~--------~-? 
state courts to suits by Indian plaintiffs unless they surrender ------------------------ ~ their sovereignty. -----
c. Violation of Due Process 
Apparently as an alternate basis for unconstitutionali-
ty, petr argues that Chapter 27-19 violates Due Process by bar-
ring access to the courts and therefore infringing on their First 
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of griev-
ances. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 u.s. 422, 429-430 
(1982); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 
u.s. 508, 510 (1972). 
Resp counters that Chapter 27-19 is an exercise of the 
"[stateJ interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law" to 
ensure compliance with the State's rules of procedure. Brief 11. 
But 1 find no evidence of an asserted waiver of procedural re-
quirements, and it is my understanding that although tribal 
o. 
plaintiffs may enjoy sovereign immunity, they still must comply 
with State procedural requirements to use State courts. More 
important, resp 's argument here fails because Chapter 27-19 is 
not a procedural provision, but a door-closing statute. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 27-19 conflicts with Pub.L. 
( J 
28~ because it al-• 
lows State assumption of jurisdiction without a federally super-
vised election. It violates Equal Protection as a classification 
based on race, and is not sanctioned either as a scion of permis-
sible federal Indian classification (~, Pub.L. 280) or as a 
political classification. Finally, Chapter 27-19 is not a proce-
dural requirement, but rather a door-closing statute that denies 
Indians the right to bring suit in a defendant's court. North 
Dakota speaks with forked tongue. I recommend you fote to re-
verse the N.D. Supreme Court on the ground that the statute vio-
lates the supremacy of federal Pub.L. 284, Equal Protection, and 
Due Process. 
March 5, 1986; 4:01 PM Cabell Ben. Mem. 
. . 
lfpjss 03/11/86 THREE SALLY-POW 
84-1973 Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering 
(Supreme Court of North Dakota) 
(To be Argued March 24) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is an unexciting Indian case in which I was 
one of only four who voted to grant. I did so because, at 
least on its face, the Tribes appea1 to have a substantial 
equal protection claim.l I concede, however, that being 
an easterner, where the few remaining tribes now have 
equal rights under state laws, I am not at all comfortable 
in cases like this one. 
This case was here in 1984, involving the same 
parties and the same statutes, and we remanded it to have 
the North Dakota Supreme Court construe the statutes of 
that state. My clerk will have to take a look at our 
decision, though I doubt its relevancy. Three 'l'r ibes 
engaged respondent engineering firm to design a public 
1 I assume members of an Indian Tribe are within the 
protection of the Equal Protection Clause. I have not, 
however, looked at our cases. 
/\ 
~. 
works project within the f e derally recognized Indian --
reservation. Three Tribes, believing that respondent was -----
guilty of negligence and faulty design, brought this tort 
action in a North Dakota state court claiming damages of 
$425,000. The case involves the effect and validity of 
Chapter 27-19 of North Dakota Law entitled the "Indian 
C i vi 1 J u r is d i c t ion Act" • ·rhis statute, as construed by 
the North Dakota courts, required tribal governments to 
---------------~ - -
waive their immunity from state court civil jurisdiction 
for all cases as a condition for bringing an on-- --------"""- ------------------------ ~~ 
reservation damages action against a non-Indian 
engineering firm in state court. The North Dakota Supreme ____ ...... - -----._ 
Court, as I understand it, read Chapter 29-19 as barring 
all tribal plaintiffs from suing in a state court until 
Hw.. -,;...:._/...~  
t~~~-e- compl1ed with Chapter 27-19 - i.e. have waived 
~r immunity. (l am not certain 1 fully understand how 
Chapter 27-19 has been construed.) In any event, because 
\ 
of The Tribes lack of consent under Chapter 27-19, and 
"' pursuant to the state's authority under Public Law 280 to 
adopt jurisdictional statutes, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court affirmed the state trial court's dismissal of this 
case for want of subject matter jurisdiction. 
ln its decision below, the state supreme court -
claiming that it was relying on an adequate and 
independent state ground bar red the petitioners from 
----------~ 
bringing this tort action in state courts, despite the 
federal equal protection claim. The essence of the equal 
protection claim, as I understand it, is summarized in 
petitioner's brief as follows: 
"The legislative distinction established by 
Chapter 27-19, between similarly situated tribal 
Indian plaintiffs and non-Indian plaintiffs, 
creates a system of state court access that 
rests solely on differences in racial or ethnic 
characteristics. This distinction entitles a 
non-Indian defendant in state court to the 
automatic dismissal, in these circumstances, of 
any tribal plaintiff's damages action against 
him. However, that same defendant, under 
Chapter 27-19's system of state court access, is 
held to answer for any non-Indian's damages 
action in these same circumstances." 
In support of this claim of discrimination, 
petitioners rely - interestingly enough - on Bakke as well 
as Onited Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 o.s. 144, 172, 
176, for the view that the relevant standard is "stri..c_t, 
or heightened, judicial ~because the civil rights 
of Indians - an identifiable racial group - have been 
denied. 
..... 
On its face, this has a good deal of appeal. 
I tend to think nevertheless that the amicus 
brief filed by the state presents a strong argument in 
favor of affirming the decision of the North Dakota 
Supreme Court. It is summarized as follows: 
"The Indian tribes and Indian citizens of the 
state have deprived themselves of access to 
state courts because they have not accepted 
state jurisdiction": 1fiis ~as not only to 
ha~dian plaintiffs are involved, 
but it also leads to hardship for non-Indian 
plaintiffs who may have a legitimate cause of 
action against an Indian tribe or an individual 
Indian arising in Indian country. 
"Access to the courts of North Dakota is 
within the power of the petitioners. The tribe 
must merely consent to the full c1vil 
jurrsarct:lOn Wfiich-oor'Enl3ako'f"cl,- pursuant · to 
P. L. 2"81J, stands ready to of fer them." 
lf, in fact, the right to sue in state courts is 
proscribed only because Three Tribes have failed to 
consent to the full civil jurisdiction prescribed Pulbic 
Law 280, the question becomes: Why have Three Tribes 
failed to consent, and are the reasons relied upon for 
this failure valid? 
Jo 
Although my sympathies are with the Indians, 1 do 
think the case is close and will welcome a bobtail memo 
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84-1973, Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng. 
Petr contends that ch. 27-19 bars Indian plaintiffs 
from state court in circumstances where non-Indian plaintiffs 
may clearly initiate suit, and thereby violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
The "reciprocity argument" of North Dakota runs as 
follows: the Indian people have deprived themselves of access 
to state courts because they have not accepted subject matter 
jurisdiction in suits brought against them. Chapter 27-19, 
so the argument goes, is "an opportunity" for Indians to put 
themselves on an equal footing with North Dakotians by ac-
cepting this "jurisdictional offer." 
This is a mischievous argument. It ignores the fact 
that Indians are a sovereign 
------------~--- -- " nation, and obscures the real 
effect of ch. 27-19. The State has closed its courts to 
suits by Indian plaintiffs unless they consent to State ju-
risdiction over their reservations and waive tribal sovereign 
immunity from suit. 
I\. ~\. T"" 
The law effectively coerces tribes to -
surrender their sovereignty to gain access to state courts. 
March 26, 1986; 8:50 AM Cabell Oral Arg. Supp. 
t 
To: The Chief Justice ( ~ ;9 
Justice Brennan U / 
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~f. t!J SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1973 
THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FORT 
BERTHOLD RESERVATION, PETITIONER 
v. WOLD ENGINEERING ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NORTH DAKOTA 
[May -, 1986] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold 
Reservation, sought to sue respondent, Wold Engineering, 
P. C., in state court for negligence and breach of contract. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that Chapter 27-19 of 
the North Dakota Century Code (1974) disclaimed the uncon-
ditional state court civil jurisdiction North Dakota had previ-
ously extended to tribal Indians suing non-Indians in state 
court. It ruled that under Chapter 27-19, petitioner could 
not avail itself of state court jurisdiction unless it consented 
to waive its sovereign immunity and to have any civil dis-
putes in state court to which it is a party adjudicated under 
state law. 364 N. W. 2d 98 (1985). The question presented 
is whether Chapter 27-19, as construed byt ne NOrtllbakota 
Supreme Court, is repugnant to the federal Constitution or is 
preempted by federal Indian aw. C. ---..J 
- __ ____. 
I 
This is the second time this Court has been called upon to 
address this jurisdictional controversy. See Three Affiliated 
Tribes v. Wold Engineering (Three Tribes!), 467 U. S. 138 
(1984). Because the facts and procedural history of the liti-
gation were set forth in some detail in Three Tribes I, our 
present recitation will be brief. 
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Historically, Indian territories were generally deemed be-
yond the legislative and judicial jurisdiction of the state gov-
ernments. See id., at 142. This restriction was reflected in 
the federal statute which admitted North Dakota to the 
union, Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, § 4, cl. 2, 25 Stat. 677, 
and was embodied in the form of jurisdictional disclaimers in 
North Dakota's original Constitution. See N. D. Const., 
Art. XVI, § 203, cl. 2 (1889). The preexisting federal re-
strictions on state jurisdiction over Indian country were 
largely eliminated, however, in 1953 with Congress' enact-
ment of the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, 
28 U. S. C. § 1360, which is commonly known as Pub. L. 280. 
Pub. L. 280 gave federal consent to the assumption of state 
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country and pro-
vided the procedures by which such an assumption could be 
made. See Three Tribes I, 467 U. S., at 143. As originally 
enacted, Pub. L. 280 did not require the States to obtain the 
consent of affected Indian tribes before assuming jurisdiction 
over them, but Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1963 
amended Pub. L. 280 to require that all subsequent asser-
tions of jurisdiction be preceded by tribal consent. Pub. L. 
90-284, §§ 401, 402, 406, 82 Stat. 78-80, codified at 25 
u. s. c. §§ 1321, 1322, 1326. 
As this Court explained in Three Tribes I, 
"[e]ven before North Dakota moved to amend its Con-
stitution and assume full jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court had taken an expan-
sive view of the scope of state-court jurisdiction over 
Indians in Indian country. In 1957, the court held [in 
Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N. W. 2d 432] that the ex-
isting jurisdictional disclaimers in the Enabling Act and 
the State's Constitution foreclosed civil jurisdiction over 
Indian country only in cases involving interests in Indian 
lands themselves." 467 U. S., at 143-144. 
Although Vermillion was decided after the enactment of 
Pub. L. 280, the North Dakota Supreme Court made clear 
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that it was confirming pre-existing jurisdiction rather than 
establishing a previously unavailable jurisdictional category. 
Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, supra, at 435-436. See also 
Three Tribes I, supra, at 150, n. 9. 
That part of Vermillion that recognized jurisdiction over 
non-Indians' claims against Indians impermissibly intruded 
on tribal self-government and thus could not be sustained. 
I d., at 148. See also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382 
(1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959). But, as this 
Court in Three Tribes I affirmed, North Dakota's recognition 
of jurisdiction over the claims of Indian plaintiffs against non-
Indian defendants was lawful because such jurisdiction did 
not interfere with the right of tribal Indians to govern them-
selves and was not subject to Pub. L. 280's procedural re-
quirements since the jurisdiction was lawfully assumed prjor 
to that enactment. See 467 U. S., at 148-149, 151, n. 11. 
In 1958, North Dakota amended its Constitution to author-
ize its legislature to provide by statute for the acceptance of 
jurisdiction over Indian country, see N. D. Const., Art. 
XIII, § 1, cl. 2, and in 1963, the North Dakota legislature en-
acted Chapter 27-19. That Chapter provides, in pertinent 
part: 
"In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 280 
... and [the amended] North Dakota constitution, juris-
diction of the state of North Dakota shall be extended 
over all civil causes of action which arise on an Indian 
reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens in a man-
ner provided by this chapter. Upon acceptance the ju-
risdiction of the state shall be to the same extent that the 
state has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, 
and those civil laws of this state that are of general appli-
cation to private property shall have the same force and 
effect within such Indian reservation or Indian country 
as they have elsewhere within this state." N. D. Cent. 
Code § 27-19-01 (1974). 
; 
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In subsequent cases, the North Dakota Supreme Court read 
this provision to "completely disclaim" the state jurisdiction 
recognized in Vermillion in cases in which the defendant was 
an Indian, absent tribal consent to jurisdiction as provided by 
statute. See, e. g., In re Whiteshield, 124 N. W. 2d 694 
(1963). However, until the instant suit, the court never 
squarely held that Chapter 27-19 also disclaimed the jurisdic-
tion Vermillion lawfully recognized over cases in which an 
Indian sued a non-Indian in state court for a claim arising in 
Indian country. See Three Tribes I, supra, at 144-145. 
Petitioner filed the in~t_suit,.against respondent in state - -------court for negligence and breach of contract in connection with 
respondent's cons ruction of a wa er-supply system on peti-
tioner's reservation. At the time the suit was filed, petition- ~ 
er's tribal court did not have jurisdiction over such claims. T ~ 0 
After coun er-e a1mmg or peti 1oner's a ~e J.._a..i} ~ 
payments on the ~stem, respondent moved to dismiss peti- , 
tioner's iate eeHIIt complaint, arguing that the state court :f ~ -
had no jurisdiction ecause petitioner has never consented to 
state-court jurisdiction over the Fort Berthold Reservation 
under Chapter 27-19. The trial court dismissed the suit for 
lack of jurisdiction, and the North Dakota Supreme Court af-
firmed the dismissal on appeal. 321 N. W. 2d 510 (1982). 
In so doing, the North Dakota u erne Court held that 
any residuary jurisdiction the North Dakota courts possessed 
under Vermillion over suits by an Indian against a non-In-
dian arising in Indian country was "totally disclaimed" when 
the North Dakota legislature, "(u]nder the authority of Pub-
lic Law 280," instituted the consent requirement of Chapter 
27-19. Id., at 511-512. It co!!£_lu~d that "we have no ju-
risdiction over civil causes of action arising within the exte-
rior boundaries of an Indian reservation, unless the Indian 
citizens of the reservation vote to accept jurisdiction." I d., 
at 512. The court also rejected petitioner's Federal and 
State constitutional challenges, relying in part on the argu-
ment that the discrimination against Indian litigants embod-
84-1973-0PINION 
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ied in Chapter 27-19 was authorized by Pub. L. 280 and was 
therefore insulated, under Washington v. Yakima Indian 
Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979), from heightened scrutiny. See 
321 N. W. 2d, at 512-513. 
This Court granted certiorari. 461 U. S. 904 (1983). We I 
held that federal law did not preclude the state court/ from /tJ:. U 
asserting jurisdiction over petitioner's claim. In particular, 
we ruled that Pub. L. 280 neither required nor authorized 
North Dakota to disclaim the jurisdiction it had lawfully ex-
ercised over the claims of Indian plaintiffs against non-Indian 
defendants prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 280. See Three 
Tribes I, 467 U. S., at 150. Because the North Dakota 
Supreme Court's interpretation of Chapter 27-19 and its ac-
companying constitutional analysis appeared to rest on a pos-
sible misunderstanding of Pub .. L. 280, this Court vacated the 
judgment and remanded the case to allow the North Dakota 
court to reconsider the jurisdictional questions in light of the 
proper interpretation of the governing federal statute. I d., 
at 141. 
On remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that 
Chapter 27-19 terminated any residuary jurisdiction that 
may have existed over claims arising in Indian country 
brought by tribal Indians against non-Indians in state court. 
364 N. W. 2d, at 104. It further held that state law barred 
petitioner from maintaining its suit in state court absent its 
waiver of its sovereign immunity in accordance with the stat-
utory procedures. Id., at 103-104. Finally, the court re-
jected petitioner's due process and equal protection chal-
lenges. It stated that petitioner had not been denied a due 
process right to access to the courts by action of the state, 
reasoning that it was the Indian people who had deprived 
themselves of access to state jurisdiction in declining to avail 
themselves of the State's jurisdictional offer by waiving their 
sovereign immunity. See id., at 106. The North Dakota 
court then ruled that the jurisdictional disclaimer did not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause because, by virtue of the 
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consent provision, "[t]he statute does not treat [the Tribe] 
less than equal, it treats them more than equal." !d., at 107. 
We granted certiorari to examine etitioner's claims that 
Chapter vio ates the federal Constitution ~ i~e­
empted b federal nd1an la . Although respondent at no 
time objected to our cons1aeration of the federal preemption 
issue, and in fact briefed it on the merits, our review of the 
proceedings below indicates that this question was not explic-
itly raised before, and was not decided by the North Dakota 
Supreme Court. We have recognized that in such circum-
stances that there is "weighty presumption against review." 
Heath v. Alabama,-- U. S. -- (1985). See also Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 218-222 (1983). We believe, how-
ever, that this presumption has been overcome in this in-
stance by a comoma ton o c urns ances. 
1rst, respon en s fallure to raise any chaHenge to our 
consideration of the preemption issue, cf. City of Oklahoma 
City v. Tuttle,-- U.S.--,-- (1985), and its apparent 
willingness to have the question decided, argues for review. 
Second, this case has already been sent back to the North Da-
kota Supreme Court once, and we are reluctant to further 
burden that court by resolving less than all the federal ques-
tions addressed by the parties. Since we have twice had the 
benefit of the Supreme Court of North Dakota's reasoning on 
closely aligned issues, we do not believe that our consider-
ation of the federal preemption issue is a disservice to that 
court or to the litigants, or impairs our informed decision of 
the issue. 
Because we believe that the North Dakota law is pre-
empted insofar as it is applied to disclaim preexisting juris-
diction over suits by tribal plaintiffs against non-Indians for 
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which there is no other forum, absent the Tribe's waiver of 
its sovereign immunity and consent to the application of state 
civil law in all cases to which it is a party, we reverse. 
II 
Our cases re~~"~end ... away from ~dea _2f inh~r­
ent Indian soverei nty as a[n inde endent] bar to state juris-
dictiOn ana toward, reUan<;e -.9n fe~ral pre-emption. " . Rice 
v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 718 (1983) (quoting - cClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 172 (1973) (foot-
note omitted)). Yet considerations of tribal sovereignty, 
and the federal interests in promoting Indian self-governance 
and autonomy, if not of themselves sufficient to "preempt" 
state regulation, nevertheless form an important backdrop 
agatnst which the applicable treaties and federal statutes 
must be read. See, e. g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 334 (1983); Rice v. Rehner, supra, at 
718-719. Accordingly, we have formulated a comprehensive 
preemption inquiry in the ndian aw contex w ic examines 
no on y e congressional plan, but also "the nature of the 
state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry de-
signed to determine whether, in the specific context, the ex-
ercise of state authority would violate federal law." White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 145 
(1980). In the instant case, this preemption inquiry yields 
the conclusionthatt he legislative~ L. 
28 forecloses North Dak ta from 1scla1ming Jlii=ISdiction 
over petitio~it, and further, that the sta e interest 
advanced by the North Dakota jurisdictional scheme in this 
context is overshadowed by long-standing federal and tribal 
interests. 
A 
Pub. L. 280 represents the primary expression of federal 
policy governing the assumption by States of civil and crimi-
nal jurisdiction over the Indian Nations. The Act was the 
result of "comprehensive and detailed congressional scru-
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tiny," Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423, 
424, n. 1, 427 (1971), and was intended to replace the ad hoc 
regulation of state jurisdiction over Indian country with gen-
eral legislation, providing "for all affected States to come 
within its terms." S. Rep. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 
(1953). See also Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of 
State Jurisdiction. over Reservation Indians, 22 U. C. L. A. 
L. Rev. 535, 540-544 (1975). In examining the effect of com-
prehensive legislation governing Indian matters such as this, 
"our cases have rejected a narrow focus on congressional in-
tent to pre-empt state law as the sole touchstone. They 
have also rejected the proposition that pre-emption requires 
'an express congressional statement to that effect.'" New 
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra, at 334 (quoting 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra, at 144) 
(footnote omitted). See also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S., at 
719. Rather, we have found that where a detailed federal 
regulatory scheme exists and where its generai thrust will be 
impaired by incompatible state action, that state action, with-
out more, may be ruled preempted by federal law. See, 
e. g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 
u. s. 685 (1965). . 
Given the comprehensiveness of the federal regulation in 
this area of Indian law, our conclusion in Three Tribes I that 
Congress generally intendea to authonze the assumption, not 
the disclaimer, of state jurisdiction over Indian country is 
--.> 
persuasive evidence that the instant disclaimer conflicts with 
the federal scheme. See 4 . . , at 150. But we need not 
restupon this conclusion alone, for Congress' specific treat-
ment of the retrocession of previously assumed jurisdiction 
permits no doubt that North Dakota's disclaimer is inconsist-
ent with the requirements of Pub. L. 280. 
As originally enacted, Pub. L. 280 plainly contemplated 
that, if States chose to extend state court jurisdiction over 
causes of action arising in Indian country, they would be re-
quired to honor that commitment, for the Act made no provi-
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sion for States to return any jurisdiction to the United 
States. See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 370 
(1982 ed.) (hereinafter Cohen). Congress' failure to provide 
for the retrocession of jurisdiction assumed by the States is 
fully consistent with the purposes underlying Pub. L. 280: 
promoting the gradual assimilation of Indians into the domi-
nant American culture and easing the fiscal and adminis-
trative burden borne by the federal government by virtue of 
its control over Indian affairs. See Goldberg, supra, at 
542-544. See also H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 
3, 6 (1953). Were States permitted to, at their option and at 
any time, retrocede all or part of the jurisdiction they had as-
sumed and to leave Indians with no recourse for civil wrongs, 
the congressional plan of gradual but steady assimilation 
could be disrupted and the divestment of federal dominance 
nullified. 
When Congress subsequently revisited the question of ret-
rocession in the 1968 Amendments, it provided that "[t]he 
United States is authorized to accept a retrocession by any 
State," 25 U. S. C. § 1323(a), but it specifically limited this 
authorization to the retrocession of jurisdiction assumed 
under Pub. L. 280 pursuant to the original1953 version of the 
statute. See id. (permitting retrocession of jurisdiction "ac-
quired by [the] State pursuant to the provisions of section 
1162 of Title 18, section 1360 of Title 28, or Section 7 of the 
Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as it was in effect prior 
to its repeal by subsection (b) of this section"). See also 
Exec. Order No. 11435 (giving Secretary of the Interior dis-
cretionary authority to accept retrocession of jurisdiction by 
a State); Goldberg, 22 U. C. L. A. L. Rev., at 558-559. 
This retrocession provision apparently was added in response 
to Indian dissatisfaction with Pub. L. 280. See Cohen 370. 
In light of this congressional purpose, the fact that Congress 
did not provide for retrocession of jurisdiction lawfully as-
sumed prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 280 or of jurisdiction 
assumed after 1968 cannot be attributed to mere oversight or 
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inadvertence. Since Congress was motivated by a desire to 
shield the Indians from unwanted extensions of jurisdiction 
over them, there was no need to provide for retrocession in 
those circumstances because the previously-assumed juris-
diction over Indian country was only lawful to the extent that 
it was consistent with Indian tribal sovereignty and self-gov-
ernment, see, e. g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 217, and 
the jurisdiction assumed after 1968 could be secured only 
upon the receipt of tribal consent. See 28 U. S. C. § 1321. 
North Dakota may not, and indeed has not attempted to, 
rely on § 1323(a) as authority for its disclaimer of jurisdiction 
over claims such as petitioner's because it did not assume 
such jurisdiction under any of the provisions specified in 
§ 1323(a), nor has the United States accepted the retroces-
sion. We have previously enforced the procedural require-
ments and the jurisdictional provisions of Pub. L. 280 quite 
stringently, consistent with our understanding that the juris-
dictional scheme embodied in that Act was the product of a 
wide-ranging and detailed congressional study. See, e. g., 
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S., at 427. 
See also Washington v. Yakima I.ndian Nation, 439 U. S., at 
484 ("the procedural requirements of Pub. L. 280 must be 
strictly followed"); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U. S., at 180. Accordingly, we conclude that 
since North Dakota's disclaimer is not authorized by 
§ 1323(a), it is barred by that section. 
In sum, because Pub. L. 280 was designed to extend the 
jurisclict:Ton of the States over Indian country and to encour-
age State assumption of such jurisdiction, and because Con-
gress specifically considered the issue of retrocession but did 
not provide for disclaimers of jurisdiction lawfully acquired 
other than under Pub. L. 280 prior to 1968, we must conclude 
that such disclaimers cannot be reconciled with the congres-
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B 
Our consideration of the State's interest in disclaiming the J 
preexisting, unconditional jurlsCliction extended to tribal In-
dians suing non-Indian defendants, and in replacing it with an 
extension of jurisdiction conditioned on the Tribe's waiver of 
its sovereign immunity and its agreement to the application 
of state law in all suits to which it is a party, reinforces our 
conclusion that Chapter 27-19 is inconsistent with federal .l 
law. Simply put, the state ~rest, as present! imple-
mented, is unduly burdensome on the fe eral and tribal 
interests. 
s tne liforth Dakota Supreme Court explained, Chapter 
27-19 was originally designed as a unilateral assumption of 
jurisdiction over Indian country, which was intended to pro-
vide a means of enforcing contracts between Indians and non-
Indians and a tribunal for trying tort actions, family law mat-
ters, and "many [other] types of actions too numerous to 
mention." 364 N. W. 2d, at 102, and n. 5. The North Da-
kota legislature added the consent provision to Chapter 27-19 
as a compromise to "accomodate the will of the Indian peo-
ple." Id., at 103. Those Indians who opposed the assertion 
of state jurisdiction against them would not be subjected to it 
absent consent, but neither would they be permitted to enjoy 
state jurisdiction as plaintiffs absent consent to suit as de-
fendants. See id., at 107. Certainly, the State's interest in 
requiring that all its citizens bear equally the burdens and the 
benefits of access to the courts is readily understandable. 
But here, federal interests exist which override this state 
interest. ~ 
The federal interest in ensuring that all citizens have ac-
cess to the courts is obviously a weighty one. See, e. g., 
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 
U. S. 509, 510, 513-514 (1972); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 741, 742-744 (1983). This 
Court and many state courts have long recognized that Indi-
ans share this interest in access to the courts, and that tribal 
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autonomy and self-government are not impeded when a State 
allows an Indian to enter its court to seek relief against a non-
Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country. See, 
e. g., Three Tribes I, 467 U. S., at 148, and n. 7 (citing au-
thority). North Dakota conditions the Tribe's access to the 
courts on its waiver of its tribal sovereign immunity and 
agreement to the application of state civil law in all state 
court civil actions to which it is or may be a party. These 
conditions apply regardless of whether, as here, the Tribe 
has no other effective means of securing relief for civil 
wrongs. As the State concedes, even if the Tribe were to 
have access to tribal court to resolve civil controversies with 
non-Indians, it would be unable to enforce those judgments in 
state court; thus, the Tribe cannot be said to have a meaning-
ful alternative to state adjudication by way of access to other 
tribunals in such cases. See Tr. Oral Arg. 26, 27. Cf. 
Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N. W. 2d 430 (ND 1977). Respondent 
argues that the Tribe is not truly deprived of access to the 
courts by the North Dakota jurisdictional scheme because the 
Tribe could have unrestricted access to the State's courts by 
"merely" consenting to the statutory conditions. We con-
clude,. however, that those statutory conditions may be met 
only at an unacceptably high price to tribal sovereignty and 
thus operate to effectively bar the Tribe from the courts. 
The North Dakota jurisdictional scheme requires the Tribe 
to accept a potentially severe intrusion on the Indians' ability 
to govern themselves according to their own laws in order to 
regain their access to the state courts. The statute provides 
that "[t]he civil jurisdiction ·herein accepted and assumed 
[upon Indian consent] shall include but shall not be limited to 
the determination of parentage of children, termination of pa-
rental rights, commitments by county mental health boards 
or county judges, guardianship, marriage contracts, and ob-
ligations for the support of spouse, children, or other depend-
ents." N. D. Cent. Code § 27-19-08. Although these sub-
jects clearly encompass areas of traditional tribal control, see 
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Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S., at 388-389; Quiver v. 
United States, 241 U. S. 601 (1916), the North Dakota stat-
ute contemplates that state civil law will control in these 
areas. See § 27-19-01. Respondent argues that Chapter 
27-19 safeguards tribal self-government by also providing 
that any tribal ordinance or custom "shall, if not inconsistent 
with the applicable law of this state, be given full force and 
effect in the determination of civil causes of action pursuant 
to this section." § 27-19-09. This provision plainly pro-
vides that state law will generally control, however, and will 
merely be supplemented by nonconflicting Indian ordinances 
or customs, even in cases that arise on the reservation, that 
involve only Indians, and that concern subjects which are 
within the jurisdiction of the tribal court. 
This result simply cannot be reconciled with Congress' jeal-0 
ous regard for Indian self-governance. See, e. g., New Mex-
ico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S., at 334-335, and 
n. 17 ("both the tribes and the Federal Government are 
firmly committed to the goal of promoting tribal self-govern-
ment, a goal embodied in numerous federal statutes"). See 
also Fisher v. District Court, supra, at 388-389. "'A tribe's 
power to prescribe the conduct of tribal members has never 
been doubted, and our cases establish that 'absent governing 
Acts of Congress,' a State may not act in a manner that in-
fringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own 
laws and be ruled by them." New Mexico v. Mescalero 
Apache Tribe, supra, at 332 (quoting McClanahan v. Ari-
zona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S., at 171-172). 
Chapter 27-19's requirement that the Tribe consent to suit 
in all civil causes of action before it may again gain access to 
state court as a plaintiff also serves to defeat the Tribe's fed-
erally-conferred immunity from suit. The common law sov-
ereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is a necessary corol-
lary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance. See, e. g., 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49 (1978). Of 
course, because of the peculiar "quasi-sovereign" status of 
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the Indian tribes, the Tribe's immunity is not congruent with 
that which the Federal Government, or the States, enjoy. 
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 
U. S. 506, 513 (1940). Cf. also McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n, supra, at 173. And this aspect of tribal 
sovereignty, like all others, is subject to plenary federal con-
trol and definition. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
supra, at 58. Nonetheless, in the absence of federal authori-
zation, tribal immunity, like all aspects of tribal sovereignty, 
is privileged from diminution by the States. 
To be sure, not all conditions imposed on access to state 1 
courts which potentially affect tribal immunity, and thus 
tribal self-government, are objectionable. For instance, 
even petitioner concedes that its tribal immunity does not ex-
tend to protection from the normal processes of the state 
court in which it has filed suit. See Tr. Oral Arg. 7, 10-11 
("The Three Affiliated Tribes believe it would be proper in 
the interests of justice that they would be subject to discov-
ery proceedings and to proceedings that would insure a fair 
trial to the non-Indian defendants"). Petitioner also con-
cedes that a non-Indian defendant may assert a counter-claim 
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject of the principal suit as a set-off or recoupment. See 
Tr. Oral Arg. 6-7, 9. It is clear, however, that the extent of 
the waiver presently required by Chapter 27-19 is unduly in-
trusive on the Indian's common law sovereign immunity, and 
thus on its ability to govern itself according to its own laws. 
By requiring that the Tribe open itself up to the coercive ju-
risdiction of state courts for all matters occurring on the res-
ervation, the statute invites a potentially severe impairment 
of the authority of the tribal government, its courts, and its 
laws. See, e. g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S., at 
387-388. * 
*The extent to which respondent's counter-claim may be used not only 
to defeat or reduce petitioner's recovery, but also to fix the Tribe's affirma-
tive liability has been the subject of some discussion in this case. See, 
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Pub. L. 280 certainly does not constitute a "governing Act 
of Congress" which validates this type of interference with 
tribal immunity and self-government. We have never read 
Pub. L. 280 to constitute a waiver of tribal sovereign im-
munity, nor found Pub. L. 280 to represent an abandonment 
of the federal interest in guarding Indian self-governance. 
As we explained in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 
387-388 (1976): 
"Today's congressional policy toward reservation Indi-
ans may less clearly than in 1953 favor their assimilation, 
but Pub. L. 280 was plainly not meant to effect total 
assimilation . . . . [N]othing in its legislative history re-
motely suggests that Congress meant the Act's exten-
sion of civil jurisdiction to the States should result in the 
undermining or destruction of such tribal governments 
as did exist and a conversion of the affected tribes into 
little more than 'private, voluntary organizations,'" 
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975) 
. . . . The Act itself refutes such an inference: there is 
notably absent any conferral of state jurisdiction over 
the tribes themselves, and §4(c), 28 U. S. C. § 1360(c), 
providing for the 'full force and effect' of any tribal ordi-
nances or customs 'heretofore or hereafter adopted by an 
Indian tribe . . . if not inconsistent with any applicable 
civil law of the State,' contemplates the continuing vital-
ity of tribal government." (Footnote omitted). 
Certainly, the 1968 Amendments to Pub. L. 280 pointedly 
illustrate the continuing congressional concern over tribal 
sovereignty. The impetus for the addition of a consent re-
quirement in the 1968 Amendments was congressional dis-
satisfaction with the involuntary extension of state jurisdic-
tion over Indians who did not feel they were ready to accept 
e. g., Tr. Oral Arg. 6-11. We have no occasion to resolve this issue be-
cause the case comes to us before trial and we do not know the extent of 
the counter-claim asserted by respondent. 
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such jurisdiction, or who felt threatened by it. See, e. g., 
S. Rep. No. 90-721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1968) (views of 
Sen. Ervin) ("Tribes have been critical of Public Law 280 be-
cause it authorizes the·unilateral application of State law to 
all tribes without their consent and regardless of their needs 
or special circumstances. Moreover, it appears that tribal 
laws were unnecessarily preempted ... . ");Rights of Mem-
bers of Indian Tribes: Hearing on H. R. 15419 and Related 
Bills Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the 
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. 25 (1968) (referring to tribal consent requirement as 
a way to ensure that Indians are not "subjected" to state 
courts' jurisdiction before they are ready). 
In sum, the State's interest is overly broad and overly in-
trusive when examinedagainst the bac~eral 
anfithbal interests implicated in this case. See Rice v. 
Rehner, 463 U. S., at 719. The perceived inequity of per-
mitting the Tribe to recover from a non-Indian for civil 
wrongs in instances where a non-Indian allegedly may notre-
cover against the Tribe simply must be accepted in view of 
the overriding federal and tribal interests in these circum-
stances, much in the same way that the perceived inequity of 
permitting the United States or North Dakota to sue in cases 
where they could not be sued as defendants because of their 
sovereign immunity also must be accepted. Our examina-
tion of the state, tribal, and federal interests implicated in 
this case, then, reinforces our conclusion that North Dakota's 
disclaimer of jurisdiction over suits such as this cannot be 
reconciled with the congressional plan embodied in Pub. L. 
~0. \ The judgment of the North Dakota Supreme Court is re-
versed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsist-
ent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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